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Does OPEC Set Oil Prices?
Over the first half of this year, the price of oil fell
by more than fifty percent. The proximate cause
ofthis sharp drop was the failure of the members
of OPECto agree on the steps needed to reduce
the cartel's output of oil. This disagreement and
its eventual outcome contrasts markedly with
the two sharp increases in the price of oil during
the 1970s, when the cartel was successful in
coordinating its efforts to curtail output. These
episodes appear to have fostered the belief that
OPEC alone can determine the price of oil.
In this Letter, we argue that there is substantial
evidence indicating that the foreign exchange
value ofthe dollar significantly influences the
price of oil even though short-term swings in
that price make it appear to be determined inde-
pendently of other economic developments.
While OPEC's actions have had a considerable
impact on the price of oil over the last fifteen
years, the nature of this impact has had more to
do with the extent and the timing of these price
changes than their direction.
The dollar and the price of oil
The value ofthe dollar has an important influ-
ence on the price of oil because crude oil traded
in world markets is priced in dollars. When the
value of the dollar falls, oil-importing nations
find that the price ofoil in terms of their own
currencies has also fallen. Consequently, they
raise their consumption of oil. At the same time,
oil exporters discover that the price of oil mea-
sured in their own currencies has decreased.
They react by reducing the quantity of oil they
are willing to supply at the prevailing dollar
price. Both reactions tend to raise the dollar
price of oil.
Thus, a decrease in the value of the dollar will
lead to an increase in the dollar price of oil.
Similarly, an increase in the value ofthe dollar
will lead to a decrease in the dollar price of oil.
This discussion is not meant to deny a role for
OPEC in determining oil prices. Since the value
ofthe dollar affects the revenues of oil pro-
ducers, it is extremely likely that OPEC's actions
are strongly influenced by changes in the value
ofthe dollar.
Relationship until 1985
The behavior of oil prices and the dollar's value
from the late 1950s to 1985 is consistent with
the hypothesis presented. Oil prices were rela-
tively stable until about 1970, as was the dollar's
value (see Chart 1). Large declines in the value
ofthe dollar preceded both "oil shocks" of the
1970s. And the large increase in the value of the
dollar in the early 1980s was followed by falling
oil prices.
Formal statistical tests confirm the existence of
an inverse relationship between oil prices and
the dollar. Test results reveal that an increase in
the valueofthe dollar begins to lower the price
of oil approximately two quarters later, with the
peak effect occurring after approximately two
years. Furthermore, changes in the value of the
dollar account for almost halfofthe variation in
oil prices over the period 1956-1985.
Interpreting the findings
These findings suggest that, given the behavior
of the dollar during this period, the dollar price
of oil would have increased in the 1970s and
decreased in the 1980s even in the absence of
OPEC. More specifically, they suggest that a
large proportion ofthe price increases that took
place during the so-called oil priceshocks of the
1970s actually represented discontinuous price
adjustments to changes in the economic
environment. This discontinuity in oil price
cha.nges probably resulted from the cartel's
mode of operation, which has been one of mak-
ing large changes in output while adhering to a
pre-announced dollar price.
The 1973 "oil shock" episode provides one
example ofthis behavior. The rate of inflation in
the United States had begun to pick up in the
late 1960s. The dollar depreciated sharply in
1971, stabilized for a while, and then fell again
in late 1972-early 1973. The price of oil stayed
more or less unchanged until well into 1973,
when it jumped to approximately 3 times its ear-
lier level. In a competitive market, the dollar
price of oil would probably have reflected
changes in the dollar's value somewhat earlier.FRBSF
Once again, we are not claiming that the entire
increase in oil prices during this episode can be
explained by exchange rates, only that a consid-
erable proportion of it would have taken place
- perhaps in a more gradual manner - even
without OPEC.
The price of oil in 1986
At first glance, the sharp fall in the price of oil in
early 1986 seems to contradict the hypothesis
discussed earlier. After all, the dollar had been
falling since early 1985. Why then did the price
of oil decline so dramatically? To answer this
question, we need to look at developments a
few years earlier.
Chart 1
The Price of Oil has Varied Inversely
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A. OPEC Exacerbates Price·Changes
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OPEC's Impact on the Price of Oil
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The dollar began to appreciate steadily after
1980. This appreciation, which continued for
approximately five years, tended to reduce non-
u.s. demand for oil while increasing supply
from countries other than OPEC. In the absence
of any action by the cartel, these developments
would have reduced the price ofoil.
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B. OPEC Does Not Change Direction of Prices
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OPEC's response, with the exception of a small
price cut in 1982, was to make large reductions
in output. Through cutbacks, it succeeded, at
least for a time, in keeping oil prices relatively
stable - in marked contrast to the prices of
other commodities. But whilethe cartel man-
aged to slow the price adjustments required by
market forces, it was ultimately unable to with-
standthe pressures generated by the conflict
between these forces and its own policies. Dis-
agreements about how the necessary reductions
in output were to be allocated among members
of the cartel led to the collapse of oil prices.
A straightforward way to test the validity ofthis
scenario is to use statistical techniques to mea-
sure the historical relationship between the
value of the dollar and the price of oil, and then
to predict the price ofoil today on the basis of
this relationship. Such a test was carried out by
estimating the relationship between the quarterly
growth rates ofthe price ofoiI and the exchange
rate from 1959 to 1978, which is the year before
the "second oil shock". This relationship and
the actual values ofthe exchange rate were then
used to "predict" the growth rate ofthe price of
oil from the firstquarter of 1979 to the second
quarter of 1986.
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1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986The results (shown in Chart 2A) reveal that,
given knowledge of the relationship between oil
prices and exchange rates prior to 1979 and the
value ofthe dollar since then, we would have
predicted increases in the price of oil through
the end of 1981. Since this prediction is made
without knowledge ofOPEC's actions, it implies
that the widely held view that the price ofoiI
increased in 1979 simply because OPEC
decided to charge more for a barrel of oil should
be treated with some skepticism.
Based on the historical relationship, we would
also have predicted decreases in the price of oil
through the first quarter of 1986. This pattern is
consistent with the actual changes in oil prices
over this period, although we do underestimate
the increases in the pre-1982 period (most
noticeably in the first quarter of 1981) and pre-
dictdecreases that were sharper than those that
actually occurred prior to the second quarter of
1986. We are also unable to predict the large
decline that took place in the second quarter.
In terms ofthe levels of oil prices, the "pre-
dicted" value tracks the actual price quite
closely in the beginning ofthe period, and, like
the actual price, also begins to decrease after the
middle of 1981 (see Chart 2B). However, after
that year, it drops at a noticeably faster pace
than actual oil prices; atthe end of 1985, the
predicted price level is quite a bit lower than the
actual price. Nevertheless, the large decline in
oil prices in 1986 actually brings the actual
price back into line with the predicted value.
These results are not meant to demonstrate the
existence of a hypothetical "free-market" price
of oil that is determined solely by the value of
the dollar. Other forces obviously influence the
price of oil. What these results do provide is
strong evidence that the exchange rate is an
important determinant of oilprices.
They also suggest that the recent behavior of oil
prices is not very different frhm what we have
seen before. OPEC's policy of maintaining "sta-
ble prices" once again forced a sharp adjust-
ment instead ofthe gradual changes that may
otherwise have taken place in response to
changing economic conditions.
There is, ofcourse, a difference in the present
direction of OPEC's efforts - the cartel is now
obviously unwilling to accept lower oil prices.
But the crucial point is that the existence ofthe
cartel appears to have had the same effect on
price changes in either direction: it has made
them jump sharply each time.
Conclusions
Although OPEC succeeded in keeping prices
higher than they otherwise might have been in
the 1970s, it would be wrong to ascribe the
entire change in oil prices that took place during
the various oil shocks to the whims ofthe cartel.
A considerable proportion of these changes was
due to changes in the economic environment,
but the cartel's mode ofoperation led to sudden,
large jumps in the price of oil. These discon-
tinuous movements have, in turn, exaggerated
the apparent importance of OPEC in determin-
ing the price of oil.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,892 - 825 4,661 2.3
Loans and Leases1 6 183,473 - 864 2,996 1.6
Commercial and Industrial 49,988 - 761 - 1,911 - 3.6
Real estate 66,968 - 220 1,162 1.7
Loans to Individuals 39,725 144 1,652 4.3
Leases 5,577 2 152 2.8
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,655 142 1,270 11.1
Other Securities2 7,764 - 104 394 5.3
Total Deposits 208,625 2,494 4,493 2.2
Demand Deposits 56,526 3,200 4,742 9.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 37,153 1,063 - 10,162 - 21.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 18,228 25 3,774 26.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,872 - 729 - 4,021 - 2.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,403 - 500 763 1.6
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 32,345 - 318 - 6,176 - 16.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,362 - 1,353 156 0.5
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits andcash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change